

THE TAIWANESE QUESTION: PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION OR UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

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SUMMARY

About Taiwan


Taiwan's democratisation

Taiwan President Ma

US and Taiwan Relations

Taiwan and Japan Relations

A cross-strait conflict after Chen and Ma



TAIWAN

Geography

Area: 36,189 sq. km.

Cities (2009): *Capital*–Taipei

Population (Feb. 2009): 23.0 million.

Annual growth rate (2008): 0.34%.

Languages: Mandarin Chinese (official), Taiwanese, Hakka.

Political Establishment

Type: Multi-party democracy.

Major political parties: Kuomintang (KMT or Nationalist Party); Democratic Progressive Party (DPP); several small parties.

Defense proposed (2009): 17.2% of entire budget.



TAIWAN'S DEMOCRATISATION

1949 Communist forces led by Mao Zedong defeat Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists, driving him and more than a million followers to Taiwan. **Chiang sets up a government-in-exile.**

1954 **The U.S. signs a mutual-defense treaty with Taiwan**

1958 China attacks the island of Quemoy, a base for about 100,000 Nationalist troops in the Taiwan Strait, in a bid to "liberate" Taiwan. The U.S. deploys the Seventh Fleet; the Chinese back off

1971 **Taiwan is expelled from the UN and its seat given to China**, following a secret visit to Beijing by the then U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger

In 1988, **Lee Teng-hui becomes the island's first native Taiwanese President (1988-2000)**, and democratic reforms begin to take hold

In 1991, in the first full election in many decades, Kuomintang won 71% of the vote. He formally declared an end to emergency rule, which had existed since Chiang's forces originally occupied the island.

In 1993, the president Lee nominated Lien Chan, another native, to be prime minister, marking a further generational shift away from the mainland exiles.

In 1993, The first high-level talks between China and Taiwan take place in Singapore

In 1995, **A visit to the U.S. by President Lee prompts China to perform missile tests and military exercises in the Taiwan Strait** just before the island's first presidential election by universal suffrage. Lee wins

In 1998, Taiwan renewed its push for a separate UN seat—its sixth attempt in recent years. The move has been blocked each time by the Chinese government.

In 1999, President Lee rankled mainland China by announcing that he was abandoning the long-standing **“One China” policy** and that he would deal with China on a **“state-to-state basis.” Lee infuriates Beijing** implying that Taiwan is an independent sovereign nation.

In 2000, **DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian is elected President**, ending more than 50 years of Kuomintang rule

“One China” policy

The one-China policy holds that there is but one China and that Taiwan is part of China.

The 1992 Consensus

A term describing the outcome of a meeting in 1992 between China and Taiwan. The Consensus is that, on the subject of the "One China principle", both sides recognise there is only one China - both mainland China and Taiwan belong to the same China

“state-to-state basis.”

In 1999, Lee stated that “Since the introduction of its constitutional reforms in 1991, Taiwan has redefined its relationship with mainland China as being state to state relations or at least special state-to-state relations”.

THE “FIVE NOS”

Chen gave his inaugural address in 2000

1. I will not declare independence
2. I will not change the national title
3. I will not push forth the inclusion of the so-called “state-to-state” description in the Constitution
4. I will not promote a referendum to change the status quo in regards to the question of independence or unification
5. The abolition of the National Unification Council or the National Unification Guidelines will not be an issue



Maintenance of the status quo

In 2001, Taiwan eases restrictions on its companies wanting to invest in China. Two journalists from the mainland's Xinhua News Agency become the first Chinese reporters to visit Taiwan under the island's new "open door" policy

In 2002, **President Chen defines the status quo as "one country on each side of the Taiwan Strait," sparking criticism from Beijing and his domestic opponents .** Taiwan joined the World Trade Organization.

In 2003, a Taiwan airliner makes the first civilian flight to the mainland since 1949.

In 2004, **Chen announces plans for a referendum on election day on March 20, 2004, to ask voters whether the island should increase its defense budget and engage in dialogue with Beijing**

Chen used controversial issues such as “**one country on either side** (2002),” “**name change movement** (2004-2008),” “**new constitution** (2004),” “**new nation** (2004),” “**missile referendum** (2004),” “**mainland policy referendum** (2004),” “**abolishment of National Unification Council and National Unification Guidelines** (2006),” “**WHO bid in the name of Taiwan** (2007),” and “**UN bid referendum in the name of Taiwan** (2007-2008),” to provoke China

All of these escalated the cross-strait tensions. The US has regarded Chen as reckless and untrustworthy since 2006.

Chinese government adopted a policy of “listening to his words while observing his deeds” in the initial stage, hoping Chen could come back to the normal track in the cross-strait relations.

In 2008, Kuomintang (KMT) presidential candidate **Ma Ying-jeou won the ROC presidential election in Taiwan.**



Ma Ying-jeou

since 20 May 2008

Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT)



TAIWAN PRESIDENT MA

Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou assumed office on 20 May 2008. He abandoned his predecessor's pro-independence stance \Rightarrow China and Taiwan ended a six-decade ban on direct shipping, air and postal links. However, threat to Taiwan continue despite significant reduction in cross-Strait tension over the last year.

According to the US Defence department, since 2000, the military balance in the Taiwan Strait has continued to shift in China's favour. This is marked by the sustained deployment of advanced military equipment to the regions opposite Taiwan.

Ma reinforced his desire to pursue closer ties to mainland China when he outlined his economic plan.

Ma called for access to China's financial markets for Taiwanese businesses, regular passenger flights and cargo passage across the Taiwan Strait.

Ma insisted that China remove the short- and medium-range missiles facing Taiwan before he will engage in peace talks with China.

Ma realized several of his goals in November 2008, Chen Yunlin, the head of the Chinese organization that negotiates with Taiwan, visited the island, becoming the most senior mainland official to do so since 1949. He and President Ma signed several pacts that will lead to a significant increase in transportation and shipments of food between the two sides.


US AND TAIWAN RELATIONS

In 1972, U.S. President Nixon visited China, to **resume full diplomatic relations between the two nations and to end the formal U.S. ties with Taiwan**

In 1979, **The U.S. cuts formal links with Taiwan and agrees to abide by Beijing's "one China" policy**

In 1979, the **Taiwan Relations Act** passed the US Congress after the establishment of relations with the People's Republic of China and the breaking of relations between the United States and the Republic of China on the island of Taiwan by President Jimmy Carter. It more clearly defines the American position on Taiwan and its cross-strait relationship with Beijing.

TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT

1. Provides for Taiwan to be treated under U.S. laws the same as "foreign countries, nations, states, governments, or similar entities".
 2. Stipulates that the US will "consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the US " but does not mandate that the US intervene in these situations.
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
3. Requires the US “to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character”, and “to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security.” ⇒U.S. governments have sold arms to the ROC in compliance with the Taiwan Relations Act.

The PRC views the Taiwan Relations Act as "an unwarranted intrusion by the United States into the internal affairs of China."



TAIWAN AND JAPAN RELATIONS

Japan-Taiwan Relations are guided by the 1972 Japan-PRC Joint Communiqué. Since that time, Japan has maintained non-governmental, working-level relations with Taiwan since Japan does not recognize the ROC as an official government, and uses the neutral name of "Taiwan" instead.



The Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China was signed in Beijing on in 1972.

- 1. Established diplomatic relations between Japan and the People's Republic of China**
- 2. Resulted in the severing of official relations between Japan and the Republic of China.**
- 3. Ended the "abnormal relations between Japan and China"**
- 4. Recognized the People's Republic of China as the "sole government of China"**

1998 Japan-China Joint Declaration on Building a Partnership of Friendship and Cooperation for Peace and Development

Japan continues to maintain its stand on the Taiwan issue as set forth in the Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan and the Government of the PRC and reiterates its understanding that there is only one China. Japan reiterated that it will maintain its exchanges with Taiwan in the form of a private and regional nature.

In the event of the cross strait conflict, Japan would stay out of the conflict as much as possible and provide logistical and intelligence support for an American military operation. Then Japan could participate in peacekeeping operations.



**A CROSS-STRAIT CONFLICT
AFTER CHEN AND MA**

WHAT ARE MA-SIEW (VICE PRESIDENT OF PRC)'S CROSS-STRAIT POLICIES?

Ma proposed a “*modus vivendi*” approach, a “mutual non-denial” principle, and the three-no policy of “no unification, no independence, no use of force,” whereas Siew presented the idea of “cross-strait common market.”

First, Taiwan and China continue to coexist or work together while waiting for their disputes to be settled.

Second, in preparation of possible cross-strait negotiations on Taiwan's international space, a “mutual non-denial” principle is proposed because, there will be a benign mutual interaction if both sides of the Taiwan Strait do not deny each other.

Third, the three-no policy of “no unification, no independence, no use of force” is proposed to accommodate future negotiations with China on cross-strait peace agreement. Unification is not acceptable to the overwhelming majority of Taiwan people, while independence will only be a disaster to both sides of the Taiwan Strait. So long as Taiwan does not go independent and China does not seek unification, then the coercion from China against Taiwan is unnecessary.

Fourth, Frank Hsieh labeled Siew’s “cross-strait common market” as “one China common market” during the campaign, criticizing it would only hurt Taiwan’s economy after China’s intrusion with its huge professionals as well as immense poisoned agricultural and industrial products.

WHAT ARE “ONE CHINA WITH DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS” AND “1992 CONSENSUS”?

How will Ma and Siew sell their ideas to Chinese leader Hu Jintao? They understand that the cross-strait relations will not only stagnate but also deteriorate if Taiwan is determined to go independent. The only way for them to put Chinese leader at ease is to go back to the normal track of cross-strait relations under the mutual understanding of “One China with different interpretations”

Due to DPP government’s strong opposition to the use of “one China” in its relations with the mainland, Dr. Su, a former chairman of Council of Mainland Affairs in the Lee administration, proposed the term of “1992 consensus” in lieu of “One China with different interpretations” in 2000.

Chen not only refused to accept the “1992 consensus,” but also accused it of the “surrender consensus,” criticizing that its existence could never be found in the official cross-strait documents and claiming that China never recognized or accepted its existence in public.

Fortunately, what Chen completely denied is now affirmed by China and the US. On March 26, 2008, both U.S. President Bush and Chinese President Hu pointed out in their telephone conversation that the “1992 consensus” is the key to the resumption of cross-strait talks.

Ma will let Taiwan’s Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) to negotiate directly with China’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) on economic, political and peace issues.

WHAT ARE “ONE CHINA WITH DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS” AND “1992 CONSENSUS”?

“One China with Different Interpretations”?



“1992 Consensus”?



- In their telephone conversation on March 26, 2008, U.S. President George W. Bush and Chinese President Hu praise the “1992 consensus” as the key to the resumption of cross-strait negotiations.



WILL HU KEEP HIS PROMISES IN FOUR POINTS?

On March 4, 2008, Hu Jintao reiterated a four-point guideline on cross-straits relations under the new circumstances, which was initially set forth in 2005.

The four guidelines are as follows:

- (1) Never sway in adhering to the one-China principle:
- (2) Never give up efforts to seek peaceful reunification
- (3) Never change the principle of placing hope on the Taiwan people
- (4) Never compromise in opposing the "Taiwan independence" secessionist activities

US “FIVE EXPECTATIONS”

The US is playing an active role in promoting the resumption of cross-strait dialogues. Douglas Spelman, the DOS coordination chief in charge of Taiwan affairs, proposed US “five expectations” on cross-strait relations on March 25, 2008, including:

- (1) US-Taiwan relations should go back to the normal track;
- (2) Taiwan should strengthen its military defense;
- (3) China should lower its military coercion against Taiwan;
- (4) China should respect Taiwan’s international space;
- (5) both sides of the Taiwan Strait should resume the substantial dialogues.

THREE STAGES OF DIALOGUES

Raymond Burghardt, Chairman of AIT board, said on March 28, 2008 that he advised President-elect Ma to divide the cross-strait dialogues into three stages.

1st stage: Taiwan and China can tackle the issue of cross-strait charter flights and direct flights.

2nd stage: Taipei can enter into negotiations with China on cross-strait economic, trade, investment issues


3rd stage: Two parties can start the politically sensitive negotiations on peace accord, confidence-building measures (CBMs), and Taiwan's participation in NGOs and IGOs.

DO THE US AND CHINA CO-MANAGE TAIWAN

STRAIT AFFAIRS?

The US not only turned down Taiwan's request for negotiating a Taiwan-US Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and procuring F-16C/D jets, but also terminate high-level communication channels between the US and Taiwan.

The US and China have not commonly managed the Taiwan Strait affairs as they disagree on the issue of "one China," US arms sales to Taiwan, the use of force against Taiwan and how the problem of Taiwan will be solved peacefully.



However, they have reached a number of consensuses since late 2003

- (1) maintaining the *status quo* of Taiwan Strait**
- (2) preventing Taiwan independence**
- (3) promoting the resumption of cross-strait dialogues**
- (4) managing the cross-strait crises via the hotline**

As a result, mutual distrust exists not only across the Taiwan Strait but also between Taiwan and the United States. Meanwhile, there has evolved mutual trust between the United States and China since 2002.

WILL CHINA HELP MA YING-JEOU?

Although the meeting between President Hu and Taiwan's Vice President-elect Vincent Siew in 2008 is mostly symbolic, their rendezvous will bring about the cross-strait frequent direct charter flights, direct scheduled flights, direct airline connections, increased tourism, financial cooperation, and more cross-strait investment soon.

Even if China does not take advantage of its economic offers to make political profits, will it continue to help Taiwan in the third and fourth stages of negotiations when Taiwan's participation in the IGOs and NGOs, "mutual non-denial," "cross-strait common market," and Taiwan's participation in the process of East Asian economic integration are the important issues to be discussed?

Both Bush and Hu have praised the "1992 consensus" as the key to the resumption of cross-strait negotiations. Since 2005 Hu has let it be known that, as long as the island acknowledges the consensus, China is willing to live with the *status quo* while growing closer to Taiwan economically and politically.

HAVE CHINA-US-TAIWAN RELATIONS CHANGED AFTER MA'S VICTORY?



Taiwan's vice president-elect Vincent Siew, left, smiles during a meeting with Chinese President Hu Jintao on the sidelines of the Boao Forum for Asia held in Boao, southern China's Hainan province, April 12, 2008.

WILL CHINA HELP TAIWAN WHEN SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE IS INVOLVED?

First, when Hu praises the “1992 consensus” in public, stressing China will be willing to live with the *status quo* of Taiwan, why do the Chinese foreign and defense ministries have different say on the issue of “one China”?

Second, the Chinese military has long opposed US arms sales to Taiwan. However, if Taiwan does not have strong military strength to defend itself, it will not have confidence in conducting negotiations with China. The problem with China is that it can hardly change its mind-set in the short run.

Third, China has long exerted its political pressures on its allies to oppose Taiwan’s participation in the IGOs and NGOs. Meanwhile, there has been a diplomatic war between China and Taiwan for the past 60 years. The problem with China’s foreign ministry is that it can hardly change its mentality in the foreseeable future.

Fourth, if Taiwan is to be a part in the process of East Asian economic integration, it must sign FTA with the members of ASEAN. Will Hu be willing to extend his assistance to Taiwan in its participation in the ASEAN free trade area?


Fifth, as the idea of “cross-strait common market” involves the highly politically sensitive issue of sovereignty, will Hu help Siew to make his dream come true?

Sixth, according to Chinese historians and Chinese authorities, the so-called “Republic of China” has ceased in 1949. Therefore, it will be quite difficult for Beijing to acquiesce the “Republic of China,” much less recognize its existence in public.



If China is reluctant to help Taiwan to participate in the international organizations and formulate a cross-strait market, then the cross-strait talks will likely be stuck with little progress in prospect, not to mention the overall political, military and strategic talks.


Indeed, such issues as the official conclusion of the state of hostility, CBMs, peace accord, and Taiwan's political status will be more difficult for China to make concessions.



WILL US INTEREST IN TAIWAN AND THE REGION BE AFFECTED AFTER MA'S VICTORY?

The impact of improved cross-strait relations on the US-Taiwan relations.

The KMT government might adopt a cross-strait policy so favorable to China that it could affect US interests in Taiwan and damage US interests in the region. For example, Taiwan could resist US pressure that it increase military spending on the grounds that such expenditures are too high, too confrontational and may be unnecessary in light of potential improvements in cross-strait interactions.



Under the new KMT government, the United States will be faced with challenges familiar from past years,

- 1. decisions on new arms sales**
 - 2. how to accommodate requests for visits to the United States by Ma and other senior Taiwan officials**
 - 3. the level of US relations with the Ma administration**
 - 4. whether to pursue closer economic ties (such as the signing of a cross-strait FTA)**
 - 5. what role the US should play in cross-strait relations**
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HAVE CHINA-US-TAIWAN RELATIONS CHANGED AFTER MA'S VICTORY?

China-US-Taiwan relations have slightly differed from those of the past. The cross-strait relations have increasingly become warmer than ever before. Taiwan-US relations have been a little distant due to US reluctance to agree to Ma's application for a visit to the States.


While the US is still hesitating whether to grant Ma a visa, Hu not only welcomed and treated Siew as Taiwan's *de facto* deputy leader at the Boao Forum, but also promised to deliver more benefits to the island.

WILL THE US BE AN ANXIOUS PROMOTER OR A RELUCTANT MEDIATOR?

The US is playing an active role in promoting the resumption of cross-strait talks.

In addition, the US put forward “five expectations” and “three stages of dialogues” to Taiwan for consideration.

On the other hand, the United States is rather hesitant about taking any action while promoting the resumption of cross-strait talks. “Five expectations” and “three stages of dialogues” clearly reveal US’s anxious anticipation on the resumption of cross-strait negotiations.



THE US SHOULD PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE IN THE PROCESS OF SWIFT IMPROVEMENT IN CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS

The US has attempted to maintain the status quo on the Taiwan Strait, as this best serves US interests.

Taiwan hostile to mainland China can be a card in the US's hands. Such a Taiwan is a natural ally of the US that can help it expand its power in the Far East and feed the US military-industrial complex. The US will never give up this card to contain China's rise.

The US can play an active role in the process of improvement in cross-strait relations and East Asian economic integration. So far, the US tries to “take” rather than “give” from him by putting forwarding “five expectations” and “three stages of dialogues” for consideration without granting him a visa.

China's government has urged Barack Obama to oppose independence for Taiwan.

Obama supports the "one China" policy”, adherers to the three U.S.-PRC Joint Communiqués concerning Taiwan, and observes the Taiwan Relations Act. The US would continue to provide the arms necessary for Taiwan to deter possible aggression and support Taiwan’s efforts to build closer ties with the Mainland.

IS CHINA GOING TO INVADE TAIWAN?

Invading Taiwan would make little sense for China

- (1) Taiwan is the biggest provider of foreign direct investment to the country – third party intervention would be immediate if China invaded Taiwan
- (2) Taiwan appears as a justification for the Chinese military's modernization – the Taiwan issue justifies the budgetary claims of the People's Liberation Army (PLA).

CONCLUSIONS

For China and Taiwan, it is an issue of one-China vs independence.

For the US and its allies, it was neither a moral issue nor an issue of principle, nor a matter of democracy, but an issue of strategic judgment, of keeping the peace in the Strait, not a choice between expediency and principle.

END OF LECTURE

